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It is uncontroversial that scientific practices are actually responsive to both cognitive (epistemic) and social/moral interests. Nevertheless, authoritative spokespersons of the modern scientific tradition often insist that knowledge gained in the course of conducting these practices, and the theories in which it is expressed, do not (or should not) bear the indelible mark of social (moral) values — that the "core" of science is unsullied by values. Theories are appraised for the strength of the evidence supporting them, they say, and methodological decisions are made in ways that render appeal to values improper. Of course, cognitive or epistemic values, or however one may construe the criteria for appraising scientific theories, are indispensable, but they are distinguished from social, moral and other kinds of values. It is non-cognitive values that are denied to have a role in theoretical appraisal and fundamental methodological decisions.
	Scientific practices, so interpreted, do contain moments at which values may have legitimate roles, most notably the moments of technological application of scientific knowledge, of choice of specific phenomena to investigate, and of choice of specific experimental methods to use. The core of science, however, is said (for well known reasons) to remain unsullied by values involved in decisions made at these moments. It should also remain unsullied by the personal values and interests of scientific practitioners and by the fact that scientific practices cannot be engaged in unless adequate material, economic and institutional conditions are provided, and thus by the fact that they are dependent on the largesse of non-scientific institutions (government agencies, corporations, universities, philanthropic foundations, NGOs), which typically embody social values that are not subordinated to the value of gaining scientific understanding. Social and personal values can affect not only decisions made at the "non-core" moments, but also the dynamic and texture of scientific practices: when, where, by whom they are conducted, how rapidly and extensively they unfold, and whether or not they are embraced or restricted in specific societies. They can also put pressure on judgments made at the core moments. The spokespersons of the tradition readily acknowledge that such pressure can be (and sometimes is) successfully exerted, for scientific practitioners may succumb to the threats of power or the seductions of personal gain. When it is, they say that scientific understanding has been "distorted;" then, they add that standard methodological procedures are sensitive to the sources of distortion and provide built-in resistance to it. 
	According to this view scientific practices certainly have a social dimension and they are affected by the play of values. The connections are external, however; values are not dialectical partners of scientific practices, since at the core moments of the practices values should not, and in exemplary instances do not, interact in any indispensable way with the cognitive values. This leaves many aspects of the historical phenomenon of science open to investigations in social history and sociology — but not all; the adequacy of theoretical appraisals and the soundness of methodological decisions are not. This presupposes that what should count as cognitive values is independent of commitments about social values. 
	In order to avoid values intruding into the moments where they are said to be inadmissible, it is important to distinguish between the cognitive (rational) support of a theory (as providing understanding of a specified domain of phenomena) and the conditions under which it could come to gain that support — thence between the questions "On what grounds is a theory (T) accepted?" and "What explains that T became a candidate for acceptance, and that the conditions for exploring it were made available?" Similarly, Susan Haack distinguishes the questions: "How good is the evidence for a theory?" and "What are the standards for the conduct of scientific inquiry?" (Haark 1997). Social analysis may generally address the latter questions. Concerning the former, however, social analysis is only thought significant when non-cognitive values are in fact among the grounds being appealed to (explicitly or implicitly); then, it may explain how the consequent distortions of scientific knowledge came about. This also means, as Haack has emphasized, that a range of social conditions may need to be in place — contingently — in order that properly warranted theories can be accepted. The acceptability of T is not a matter for social explanation, only its actual acceptance is. It is only when T has been improperly accepted that the important question becomes: Why was T accepted? What were its causes, given that cognitive support for it is inadequate? Social explanation of the actual acceptance of T cannot displace its cognitive (rational) appraisal, and a social explanation of its cognitive appraisal tells us nothing decisive about the adequacy of the appraisal. 

II
Repeated challenges have been made in recent decades to the view — just summarized — that social (and other non-cognitive) values have no proper role at the core moments of scientific practices, those that concern theory appraisal and methodological decisions. The most recent challenges come from Helen E. Longino and Philip Kitcher (Longino 2002a; Kitcher 2001). They concur that the core moments inevitably involve both cognitive (epistemic, rational) and social (non-cognitive) aspects. Nevertheless, there seem to be three major points of disagreement between them about how the cognitive and the social interact at the core moments (Longino 2002b, 2002c; Kitcher 2002a, 2002b). These concern: (1) the relevance of social factors to the cognitive acceptability of theories, (2) the character of the pluralism that (both of them say) should mark scientific practices, and (3) the role of democratic decision-making in them. In this paper, I will address only the first point, and leave unaddressed the implications of my remarks for the other two points.
	We can get at their disagreement on this point by posing the questions: Is it constitutive of making judgments of the cognitive acceptability of theories that they be made under certain social relations (that embody specific social values) that have been cultivated among investigators (Longino)? Or is making them (sound ones) just a consequence of social interactions that occur under these relations (Kitcher)?

III
My remarks draw upon yet a third position that I have developed (Lacey 1999), and that (I believe) enables us to put into sharp relief the strengths and weaknesses of Longino's and Kitcher's positions. I distinguish between the moment of adoption of strategy and that of theory appraisal. There is also a third moment (that will be important later in the argument), that of application of scientific knowledge. Adopting a strategy involves identifying the kinds of possibilities that are to be explored, and consequently making methodological decisions about such matters as what constraints are to be put on theories that may be investigated (including what categories are to be deployed in them) and what kinds of empirical data are to be sought out and recorded. I maintain that (contrary to Longino) there is an important distinction between cognitive and social (non-cognitive) values (Lacey 2004). 
	Longino, while recognizing a distinction between the cognitive and the social, rejects (what she calls) a dichotomy between them. I suspect that she would consider the important distinction I hold to be implicated in dichotomizing, for she doesn't think that such a distinction does any interesting work in philosophy of science. I think that it does. But the distinction I make does not imply that there is a separation of cognitive and social values for, while rejecting that social values are among the grounds for cognitive value judgments, I hold that cognitive values are manifested (in theories) only in contexts where social values are also manifested (in scientific practices and institutions). That does not mean that, in those contexts, the social values are among the grounds for cognitive value judgments. Cognitive values — which (Lacey 1999: ch. 3) include such items as empirical adequacy, explanatory power, power to anticipate possibilities open to the phenomena within a theory's compass, consilience — are the desiderata of theories that are required in view of the aim of science, which I take to be: To generate and consolidate theories that express empirically-grounded and well-confirmed understanding of phenomena. They are not based in the social value or significance of a theory, from whether or not it can be useful for furthering human flourishing or one's conception of the good society.​[1]​
	 Despite claiming an important distinction between cognitive and social values, I agree with Longino that social values have important, legitimate roles in core scientific practices. They often have an indispensable role at the first moment, that of adopting a strategy (Lacey 1999: conclusion). But they do not have an indispensable role concerning appraisals of whether or not a theory (of a specified domain of phenomena) should be accepted. Here, all that matters is that the cognitive values are manifested in the light of available empirical data to a sufficiently high degree so that further investigation is unwarranted. A theory is soundly accepted (of a specified domain of phenomena), I maintain if and only if it is confirmed that it expresses well-grounded understanding of these phenomena; i.e., if and only if it manifests the cognitive values highly with respect to (an appropriate array of) empirical data gained from observing these phenomena — sufficiently highly that the knowledge expressed in the theory can be considered settled, to need no further evidential support. 
	When a theory is soundly accepted in this way, it is (I think) properly given what Kitcher calls a "modest realist" interpretation. It expresses — or the evidence supports that it expresses — truths about aspects of the phenomena of which the theory is accepted (and some of the possibilities that they permit). These are "modest truths" carrying little metaphysical baggage, and no implications about conveying complete understanding of these phenomena (and certainly not of "the world"). They are consistent with other theories expressing other truths about these phenomena and their possibilities. While not properly considered "certainties" (or "necessities") or in principle not vulnerable to further investigation, they are also not properly considered simply as provisional. The research that has been conducted has settled the matter practically. There is no reason (grounded in considerations of the cognitive values) to submit them to additional investigation, so that there is a clear enough distinction between practically settled results and provisionally entertained hypotheses.
	Normally there will be agreement (within the relevant scientific community) about what is, and what is not, settled knowledge. While such agreement per se does not signify that a theory is soundly accepted, agreements on other matters may collectively do so: e.g., that available empirical data are representative of data that could be obtained from observing the phenomena (in the relevant domain); that, in the light of this data and other actually accepted theories, the theory manifests the cognitive values highly of domains of phenomena whose limits have been thoroughly tested; and criticism has been exhausted, i.e., there are no further proposals — after allowing for a suitable lapse of time, and being open to the input (criticisms) and testing of divergent perspectives — of (potential) research projects whose outcomes might be expected to put the result into question. Without such agreements, there remains dispute about how highly the cognitive values are manifested in the theory, and the matter cannot be considered settled. (A detailed example will be discussed in Section V below.)

IV
A soundly accepted theory (of a specified domain of phenomena) is, I repeat, one of which it is confirmed that it manifests the cognitive values highly with respect to (an appropriate array of) empirical data gained from observing these phenomena. Its being soundly accepted is also the outcome of a social process, an outcome of interactions among investigators located in various institutions that embody values considered appropriate in view of the aim of scientific practices, and that foster certain norms of inquiry. Haack (1997) points out that science being social, in this way, "is an important factor contributing to its epistemological distinction." Note: "contributing to," not "constitutive of." The social process has been shaped and institutionally nurtured so that it is conducive to producing soundly accepted theories. But it is not being the outcome of any specific (actual or ideal) social process that is constitutive of a soundly accepted theory — just as it is not constitutive of being a good automobile that it has been produced through a reliable manufacturing process. Kitcher shares this position with Haack, although he differs from her (and agrees with Longino) in holding that it is important that the community of investigators reflects a suitable variety of social values.
	Longino demurs. She considers the "satisfactory performance of certain kinds of social interactions" to be constitutive of accepted theories — interactions engaged in by communities of inquiry which are governed by norms — public recognized venues for appraisal of evidence and methodology, responsiveness to criticism, public standards of appraisal, and tempered equality of participants in research practices (Longino 2002: 129–135) — followed so as to ensure that there is critical scrutiny from as many perspectives as possible. What is at stake in insisting on "constitutive of" and not just "consequence of"? The key, I conjecture, is Longino's rejection of Kitcher's "modest realism" (and any other form of scientific realism), a rejection that implies that judgments of sound theory acceptance (as defined above) are never available. Rather, she seems to hold, the cognitive worth of theory acceptance cannot be dissociated from the community in which agreement is reached on it; and thus that any distinction between settled and provisional results is community-relative and reflective of the background assumptions brought to the inquiry by this community. The relativity in question is compatible with there being a considerable amount of trans-communal agreement — even, in principle in the long run, a single theoretical perspective on the world that is shared by all these communities — but judgments of acceptance cannot be separated from the background assumptions of the communities of inquiry. For her, judgments of the kind "T is soundly accepted" are not available, but only those of the kind "given a community's background assumptions (and its commitment to a set of cognitive values), T ought to be accepted."
	There are theories, Kitcher and I hold, that are soundly accepted. True, the judgment that T is soundly accepted is made in a particular community of inquiry, and the community must be constituted in accordance with certain norms (perhaps the four proposed by Longino above!) for its judgments to be considered authentic (worthy of belief). This does not imply, however, that making the judgment that T is soundly accepted (implicitly) incorporates reference to the community. Compare: At the moment of my writing this passage, the tree outside of my office window has lost most of its leaves. This is true. I see that this is so. Clearly, if I were not located as I am, I would not be able to see it. But I do see it, and so I judge that the statement is true; it is worthy of my belief, and on the basis of my testimony it is worthy of belief generally. (But my seeing it is not constitutive of the truth of the statement; rather, my recognition of its truth is a consequence of my seeing it.) The truth of the statement is not relativized to me, although (at the moment of writing) only I was placed to recognize that it is true. This does not relativize the truth of the statement to the conditions under which it can become known. Similarly the truth of "T is soundly accepted" is not relativized to the community where the conditions are present for it to become known. Of course, outside of this community, its truth can only be known on the basis of testimony from this community, just as you (now) can only know the truth about the tree outside my window on the basis of my testimony. The implication cannot be validly drawn, from the fact that gaining knowledge depends (causally) on the availability of certain social and moral conditions, to the conclusion that knowledge is relativized to these conditions, that the conditions are constitutive of the knowledge.​[2]​   
 	Longino does not mistakenly draw this implication. Rather, her position has two sources. First, she denies (as I have said) that judgments of the kind "T is soundly accepted" are available; she denies that we can dissociate accepting theories with community-specific (perhaps not explicitly articulated) background assumptions, even after T has "survived critical scrutiny from as many perspectives as are available." Even in a community committed to critical scrutiny of theoretical proposals from as many perspectives as possible, the play of the empirical data and the cognitive values leaves T underdetermined. Then, what an accepted theory is (or what scientific knowledge is) is partially constituted by interactions (and the values they express) in the community of inquiry. Second, Longino questions whether cognitive values can be sharply distinguished from social values, and thence she entertains the view that communities of inquiry (depending on the social values they embody) may identify the cognitive values differently. Then, since cognitive values provide key public points of reference in the critical scrutiny of theories, what constitutes an accepted theory will be partially dependent on the social values of the community of inquiry. 
 	I (and Kitcher) disagree with Longino on both points. I will not address the second point in this
paper; for now, suffice it to say that her view is a consequence of failing to separate the two core moments of scientific activity: adoption of strategy and choice of theory (see Lacey 1999: ch. 9 for a detailed critical discussion). Regarding the first point, consider what I take to be exemplary instances of settled scientific results, items of scientific knowledge represented in soundly accepted theories (of specified domains of phenomena) — e.g., molecular chemistry, viral and bacterial causation of disease, electronic theory as applied in technological devices, classical mechanical accounts of terrestrial motions. When I say that they are settled I mean that there is no plausible scenario that we can describe in which a new perspective would lead to putting these results into question by (e.g.) suggesting new experimental investigations that might put them into doubt. I do not say that there cannot be such scenarios. Modest realism does not trade in necessities. We can never categorically rule out that things may radically change should hitherto unimagined and unconceived possibilities come to be realized. While it is within the scope of scientific activity to explore hitherto unrealized possibilities and how to realize them, and to expand our conceptual and imaginative powers in doing so, scientific judgments are not held to the standard of necessity. Once this is recognized there is no barrier to holding that — as a matter of fact — the sorts of results just mentioned are settled.​[3]​
	Longino does not discuss concrete instances like these, and leaves her analysis at a fairly abstract level. She may be reluctant to draw the distinctions I draw because she rejects that there is a distinction between cognitive and social values that is not realitivized to social values, and so does not separate appraisals of the sound acceptability and significance of a theory. Or perhaps because there have been theories (put to use socially in opposition to value-laden projects that Longino supports) that have wrongly been considered to be settled. These theories were accepted although they did not manifest the cognitive values in the appropriate way, and so were accepted in part because of the social value they have in the light of their adherents' interests. These cases reflect the importance of having a plurality of values represented in the scientific community; otherwise the products of inquiry may not be soundly accepted.

V
	Most of the settled results just mentioned have led to numerous applications in social life, not all of which are valued from the perspective of every value-outlook, but probably for all value-outlooks actually espoused today some of the applications are valued. I.e., these are settled results with a considerable measure of widely accepted social significance. 
	At the end of Section III I promised to give an example. Consider:

1.	Transgenic maize plants may be genetically engineered so that they produce a toxin 
fatal to a certain class of insects. 

This, I contend, is settled scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, it is not generally significant; it is not applicable in certain types of agricultural practices (organic, agroecological), and indeed its widespread application would pose threats to the integrity of these types of agriculture (Lacey 2002). It is significant, however, for the value-outlooks that are embodied in contemporary agribusiness practices, which include values connected with extending human powers to control natural objects into ever more domains of human life (and which, in turn, are reinforced by values of capital and the market). Indeed the research that settled (1) was conducted under strategies (biotechnological strategies) that have mutually reinforcing relations with these values. Having that origin does not taint its sound acceptability, but only its general significance.
	Not all results that are widely accepted in the mainstream scientific community are soundly accepted or constitute settled results. E.g.:

2a. There are no environmental hazards arising from the use of transgenic crops (including the maize plants just referred to) that pose serious risks of significant magnitude and probability of occurrence, which cannot be adequately managed under responsibly designed regulations.

2b. There are no alternate ways of farming that could be deployed instead of the transgenic-oriented ways without occasioning unacceptable risks, and that reasonably could be expected to produce greater benefits concerning productivity, sustainability and meeting human needs.

Although widely propounded, these items are not settled; critics have proposed numerous research projects (most not conducted) that might produce outcomes relevant to assessing these items negatively. (The argument that follows builds upon the analysis made in Lacey 2002.) Unless 2a has (presumptive) support, the legitimacy of applying 1 (regardless of the efficacy that its being a settled result attests to) is cast into doubt; and 2b is necessary to legitimate public policies that make transgenics central parts of agricultural policies. These items are as important to agricultural practices that use transgenics as is 1; but the research that has settled 1 barely begins to address 2a and 2b. Strategies that address the molecular structure of plant genomes, and their possibilities for modification by genetic engineering, are not suitable for investigating plants qua objects in agroecosystems, and thus for investigating the social and environmental impact of transgenics and the possibilities of production in sustainable agroecosystems. The scientific community, however, is expected to render judgments about 2a and 2b (cf. Machamer & Douglas 1999).). 
	But the very logical form of these propositions — negative existential — poses difficulties for designing appropriate research strategies. Empirical evidence for them is ultimately the absence of empirical evidence against them. Consider 2a. (Comparable claims can be made about 2b.) Evidence against it would be the actual identification of an environmental risk of significant magnitude and likelihood of occurrence that is intractable to management. But inability at the present time to identify such a risk provides evidence for 2a only if appropriate and sufficient research has been conducted. Otherwise the non-identification of serious risk may indicate only that the relevant research has not been conducted. 
	What counts as relevant research? All parties to current controversies recognize that there are risks. The dispute is about their character, extent, seriousness and manageability under well-designed regulations. The pro transgenics side emphasizes that all currently known risks can be taken care of under available regulatory guidelines. The con transgenics side points to theoretical reasons to think that serious risks are involved (some of which are connected with the socio-economic relations of production using transgenics) that will only become apparent in the long term — potential harmful effects to the environment, to the maintenance of biodiversity, to the preservation, regeneration and creation of sustainable, productive agroecosystems, and to the livelihoods of poor farmers. The pro side affirms that enough research has been done and that, therefore, the critics should assume the burden of proof. The con side denies this. What is "enough"? That depends on how serious are the moral stakes involved. The moral stakes are high for both sides, but they point in different directions. The con emphasizes potential great threats to valued sustainable agroecosystems; the pro emphasizes potential great benefits to the farmers who plant these crops and the corporations that produce them. The values of the con side push for higher standards of testing (and, although I can't make the argument now, testing under a plurality of strategies). Note: higher standards of empirical testing, not that empirical testing is irrelevant. At the present time the two sides make opposed judgments about 2a. The matter is not settled. The pro-side endorses 2a; it considers it supported by sufficient evidence to legitimate plantings of transgenic crops. The con side endorses its negation. Both sides appeal to evidence. But they appeal to different standards (and kinds!) of evidence, and their different appeals are implicated in conflicting value judgments. These judgments thus involve considerations of both cognitive and social values. 
	There is nothing special about the example I have discussed. Judgments like these are often made in the course of scientific practices (Douglas 2000). They need to be made at the moment of application, although they are not simply judgments about the value of the proposed application or the significance of a theory. When we attend to them, it is apparent that not all theory appraisal leads to acceptance (or rejection) of theories, or even the judgment that sufficient evidence is not at hand to warrant acceptance but that further investigation is needed.

VI 
Sometimes theory appraisal involves what I will call endorsing a theory (hypothesis). A community endorses P when it judges that P manifests the cognitive values sufficiently highly so that applying it (or acting informed by it) does not have to take further into account that the manifestation of the values (held by the community) may be threatened by the application, if P were to turn out to be false.​[4]​ Thus, it is constitutive of endorsing a theory (hypothesis) that it be the outcome of "satisfactory performance of certain kinds of social interactions," that it be produced under certain social relations (that embody specific social values) that have been cultivated among investigators. Different communities may endorse conflicting propositions without violating any of the canons of empirical inquiry, and while engaging in research that aims to test the degree of manifestation of the cognitive values in theories (hypotheses). It seems to me to be an open question whether or not all matters that are now matters of endorsement (where conflict reigns) can in principle be transformed eventually — after exhausting empirical inquiry — into a situation where one or other of the conflicting theories (or a successor to them) becomes soundly accepted.
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^1	  See Kitcher (2001: ch. 6) on cognitive and social aspects of "significance." I emphasize the social aspect.
^2	  These conditions may, of course, be constitutive of the significance of the knowledge.
^3	  The inference mentioned two paragraphs back might have posed a barrier, but it is fallacious. 
^4	  This is an adaptation of a thesis stated long ago in Rudner (1954); cf. Douglas (2000).
^5	  Kitcher does not make the distinction explicitly, but he has discussed the potential moral and social implications of applications of medical biotechnology in a way that intertwines empirical investigation and his broadly liberal moral outlook (Kitcher 1997).
^6	  This has implications for pluralism in the scientific community that I cannot address here.
